Additions and Omissions: the Genesis of Parerga und Paralipomena from Schopenhauer’s Manuscripts

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Parerga and Paralipomena (1851) brought enormous and lasting success to Schopenhauer — a success he had been waiting for more than thirty years. The idea to present some conceotions from The World as Will and Representation and his other books in non-systematic form was crucial in rending the mantle of silence surrounding his work for long time. The choice of simple and colloquial style in the frame of essays and aphorisms allowed him to free his thought from the burden of the system and caught the favour of those who were looking for philosophy unaffected by philosophical vernacular. The evergreen French style of maximes et réflexions and the old-fashioned German kind of Populärphilosophie¹ accommodated his metaphysical cogitations, while developing them towards what we nowadays would call “applied philosophy”.

The essential role of that work in promoting Schopenhauer’s visibility on the philosophical stage of the second half of the Nineteenth century is widely acknowledged by scholars and biographers. All of them consider Parerga and Paralipomena as vindicating Schopenhauer’s genius. Just to refer to the most recent biographical studies, it is worth recalling the already classical Safransky’s Schopenhauer und die wilden Jahre der Philosophie, which cogently summarised the reasons that contributed to the tardy popular tribute Schopenhauer enjoyed during the last decade of his life. On the Anglophone side, Cartwright’s biography enriched the picture by describing how the 1851 book triggered reviews and analyses of Schopenhauer’s philosophy outside the academic community – not only in Germany but also in England.²

It is ironic that a book with a title transliterated from ancient Greek³ could gather so many readers and fire the enthusiasm for Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

¹ The reference is not to the philosophical movement, rather to the enlightenment style that characterised philosophical writing in Germany as a reaction against the Wolffian metaphysical practice. The cultural and philosophical tradition of Göttingen, where Schopenhauer spent two years (1809–11) as a student, was of this kind.
³ Cartwright’s book (pp. 199 and 519) refers erroneously to “Parerga and Paralipomena” as a “Latin title”. The same erroneous reference to the Latin origin is in the entry “Parerga and Para-
But the irony is easily explained: even though he defended his choice of the binding title because of the scholarly nature of the book, he was well aware that this time he was not speaking to scholars and university professors. His pages would spread a “philosophy for the world”, and the world would eventually welcome them.

To accomplish such a purpose, Schopenhauer had planned a peculiar editorial operation. As the title itself suggests, the book collected: writings composed after the completion of his major works and that could have been easily added to the system (parerga); and non-systematic papers left aside from previous publications and scattered in many thousands of pages of manuscripts (paralipomena). Composed in a philosophical career spanning over four decades and different disciplines – and enriched by annotations on readings and observations on daily life – those texts had not common points but an unquenchable thirst for knowledge and understanding, an eye for detail, and the love for philosophical rumination. All this work ended in a collection of essays on different subjects and very far from the esprit de système that had dominated Schopenhauer’s previous publications.

Nonetheless we have to concede that some of the collected texts (both parerga and paralipomena) display a formidable synthesis of Schopenhauer’s thought and its several facets. Moreover they are successful in grouping together ideas and notions that were developed over the previous forty years around the essential core of The World as Will and Representation. As examples we can recall Sketch of a history of the doctrine of the ideal and the real, Transcendent speculation on the apparent deliberateness in the fate of the individual, Some observations on the antithesis of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon, On ethics, On religion, On philosophy and natural science, and On the theory of colours.

The proper nature of the book – that is not a homogeneous work and shows peculiar genesis and intentions – makes Parerga and Paralipomena an enormous repository that requires an investigation to dig out its origins. In the following pages a tentative sketch is provided. Analysis will focus on the origin and development of the opus, in order to understand – for a few selected pages – how Schopenhauer processed his manuscripts, picked them out, and proceeded with their composition within the great project of enriching the system and retrieving what had been left out.

The first aspect to consider is the meaning and importance of writing in Schopenhauer. His philosophy was thought and developed in writing. We can say that writing and philosophy in Schopenhauer coincided: there was not a

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*Paralipomena* in Cartwright, *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s philosophy*, Scarecrow Press 2005, 118-122 (see p. 119). Cartwright was probably confused by Schopenhauer’s reference to the general use of Latin words in scholarly titles while proposing the manuscript of *Parerga und Paralipomena* to Brockhaus in 1850 (see GBr, 242 ff.).

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significant oral dimension in his philosophical elaboration. It is something peculiar, if we think that at his time orality was a relevant part of philosophical activity—many philosophers being active as university professors. Their lectures were substantial in defining or implementing their philosophies, as shown by the examples of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

On the contrary, Schopenhauer had a quite different approach—that was determined by both vocation and necessity. As far as vocation, it originated at the time of his very youth, when Johanna Troisiener, his mother, obliged him to write a diary during the journeys in Germany (1800)4 and Europe (1803–1804)5. During his university years Schopenhauer wrote at length while assiduously taking notes of professors’ lectures. Those texts were enriched by personal reflections, questions, and critical observations that marked as a “writing experience” his first active participation in the philosophical and scientific culture of the time. Even his very first burst against philosophical obscurity and for intellectual honesty—during Fichte’s lectures at Berlin in winter semester 1811–12—was, as the manuscripts show, exploited in the solitary experience of writing and not orally during classes.6 And at the end of his student years, the famous dissertation conferring him the Philosophy Doctor title was judged in absentia and never orally discussed.

Orality acquired a certain relevance in Schopenhauer’s life during the winter months of 1813–14, when he assiduously visited Goethe at Weimar and collaborated with him on optics research and experiments. Another equally famous event marked by spoken words was his Probeforlesung in front of the Berlin philosophical faculty on 23 March 1820, which ended with an (for Schopenhauer) unpleasant wrangle with Hegel as a member of the jury. Both the episodes ended badly for Schopenhauer’s self-esteem and were certainly essential in rounding some traits of his character, but they hardly contributed to either genesis or adjustment of his philosophy. Schopenhauer eventually talked of philosophy when enjoying the company and the praise of both the first disciples, since the 1830s, and the more and more numerous visitors in the 1850s, after the success of Parerga and Paralipomena.7 But once again, those dialogues and discourses did not add significant elements to Schopenhauer’s philosophical achievement.

6 See the first six volumes of Schopenhauer’s Handschriftlicher Nachlaß, collected at Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz (HN (B)), and available as facsimiles at www.SchopenhauerSource.org.
7 Testimony of those meetings is in GBr and Gespr.
Quite the contrary, its system grew in isolation while residing in Dresden – a town without university at the time – and was nurtured by the silence of the civic library and several writing hours at home. Thinking and composing The World as Will and Representation was a solitary work. The only sort of philosophical dialogue he established was with the many books he owned and borrowed from the library. Such a situation was replicated during the years following the publication of his system. When he moved to Berlin, he suffered an unsuccess-ful and frustrating ten-year experience as Privatdozent at the university, where he could neither fulfil his career expectations (he never was promoted to full professor) nor profit of an audience while proffering his philosophy in spoken words. Due to the lack of students attending his lectures, he was once again pushed back to penmanship – his courses were duly written but never pronounced. At last, after fleeing university life and the cholera ravaging Berlin he docked at Frankfurt, once again a town without university but abounding in both books at the civic library and scientific culture at the Senckenberg Museum and library.

If these biographical aspects make clear the depth of the relationship between Schopenhauer’s thought and writing, some data can help to quantify that relationship. During the four years in Dresden Schopenhauer filled almost one thousand manuscript pages, hundreds of pages devoted to analysis and comment of philosophical books, as well as the eight hundred printed pages of his main work. During the period 1818–1820 he revised his system in 352 in-folio pages as lectures at Berlin. The following fifteen years, until the publication of On the Will in Nature (1836), his handwriting covered more than two thousand pages, most of them in-folio, in the notebooks Reisebuch (1818–22), Foliant (1821–22 and 1826–28), Brieftasche (1822–24), Quartant (1824–26), Adversaria (1828–30), Cogitata (1830–33), Cholerabuch (1831–32) and Pandectae (1832–37).

That pace was destined to substantial reduction by the effort in publications during Schopenhauer’s last twenty-five years. The nature of the manuscript work was modified, too. Writing aimed less at original thinking than before but was more oriented to gathering and recording ideas and notions found in books and other readings – as exemplified by the folder Philosophari. Moreover, there was a substantial attention to the already written material, according to exigencies of collecting and revising the texts for new works and new editions of previous works.

To summarise, until the 1830s Schopenhauer’s writing was a matter of philosophical creation, a laboratory of thought whose purpose was the establishment of the system and its development. Later it mainly became self-solace activity and revision – aimed to accomplish publications that, with the only exception of

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the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* and *Parerga and Paralipomena*, were new editions of previous works.

The project of a miscellany of essays, as *Parerga and Paralipomena*, was stimulated by the need of both reacting against the long and persistent nonacceptance of Schopenhauer's works and finding a new way to disseminate their ideas. According to Schopenhauer, philosophy was a vocation that required strong determination even if no success smiled upon its author. If the systematic arrangement had failed, it was important to look for new kinds of presentation: truth deserved it. That Schopenhauer was convinced his thought expressed truth is not secondary: more than his fame and intellectual heritage, he was pursuing the diffusion of a vision that could save the world and whose content was important in itself, no matter its form of communication. The peculiar genesis of *Parerga and Paralipomena* from materials discarded or never considered worthy of publication is rooted in Schopenhauer's vision of himself and his system.

It is interesting to note how different Schopenhauer's use of manuscripts in constructing *Parerga and Paralipomena* was when compared to his procedures in previous works. Of course it is not easy to generalise when unfolding this kind of analysis and risk of simplification is always impending, but some examples can clarify and bring evidence to that observation.

Let us consider the theme of the primacy of the will over the intellect, from its first version in the manuscripts to its publication in chapter 19 of the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*. Even if the subject had been already discussed in the first volume, Schopenhauer thought it crucial to emphasize it: in 1820 he started a long process of pondering that lasted more than twenty years, produced about 120 manuscripts pages and was concluded with the longest chapter of the second volume (together with chapter 41 On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our true Nature). Examining the manuscripts, we can observe that they were almost totally exploited for composing the published chapter and later the subject was not discussed anymore. It could be said that after 1844 there were not "things left-overs" on the issue.9

We can notice a specific difference between manuscripts written before and after 1844. *Spicilegia* (written down in the period 1837–52), *Senilia* (started in 1852) and the folder *Philosophari* are mostly a collection of notes, texts, and sources devoted to the preparation of new editions of previously published books and the *parerga* of the 1851 work. Their function was less to articulate the system than to find the key to a new exposition of the system – an exposition more fitted to the public than to academic readers.

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This is the reason for the peculiar contents of *Parerga and Paralipomena*, composed of essays on varied subjects, some actually demanding and others popular, almost light – but always driven by the eagerness to both display and explain the world by the doctrine of the will. Having this in mind, we can read the 1831 work as an utterance of Schopenhauer’s deep concerns: what he considered essential in his philosophy and for its diffusion and legacy.

This is the point of view from which to analyse and assess Schopenhauer’s way to approach the project of his last work. Of course, it is necessary to keep in mind that it was not a monograph but a collection of essays, each one having its own status and function – and whose story will be inevitably different.

Starting with the first one – Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real – it is easy to ascertain that its contents and their accurate reference to the main protagonists of early modern philosophy are retrieved from manuscripts of the 1810s and 1820s. Bacon, Locke, and Leibniz had already been analysed in handwritings dating back to the Dresden years\(^\text{10}\). Malebranche, Spinoza, Berkeley, and Hume are much less discussed in the manuscripts but have a significant presence in Schultze’s lectures at Göttingen – Schultze having been Schopenhauer’s teacher in summer semester 1810 and winter semester 1810–11\(^\text{11}\). Such an early acquaintance with those philosophers is testified by their inclusion in Schopenhauer’s works, starting with the first edition of *The World as Will and Representation*. But in *Parerga and Paralipomena* something new happened: context and structure transformed the reference. Those thinkers are not mentioned for their philosophies in relation to Schopenhauer’s anymore, but as part of a historical process: the history of the notions of the ideal and the real analysed with Kant and his Copernican revolution in mind.

A closer look to the manuscripts exhibits a new approach to early modern philosophers different from the first edition of the system. Around 1830 Schopenhauer made a first reference to the historical aspect of the relationship ideal–real while discussing and criticising Schelling’s identity of the ideal and the real.\(^\text{12}\) In the notebook *Pandectae* the analysis of the duality “Reales und Ideales” is developed in a series of handwritings of 1833 – and unfortunately still unpublished\(^\text{13}\). From this moment on, Schopenhauer examined mainly the historical dimension of the relationship between the ideal and the real and discussed the

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10 See HN (B) XVIII and XIX.
12 *Cogitata*, t. 59 (HN (B) VIII). See also HN IV (1), 11.
13 *Pandectae*, t. 81–100 (HN (B) VIII).
connection between the historical transformation and the theoretical meaning of the two notions. According to this kind of analysis, Schopenhauer judged the appearance of the counterposition between the ideal and the real ("die Kontroverse über das Reale und Ideale") to be an essential and absolutely new advance in the growth of the modern spirit (a "Wendepunkt der Philosophie").\textsuperscript{14}

Looking at the manuscript notebooks \textit{Pandectae} and \textit{Spicilegia}, we can observe that all the passages devoted to such a historical reading of the couple ideal–real entered in the pages of \textit{Parerga and Paralipomena}.\textsuperscript{15} It was a true case of "things added": the ideal–real topic as developed in the period 1837–1841 provided a new perspective on the position of Schopenhauer’s system in prekantian and postkantian philosophy. The question of Kant’s legacy – that animated the debate among the postkantian generation – and Schopenhauer’s own criticism of Schelling’s identity of the ideal and the real were both reconsidered and reinterpreted within a wider historical-theoretical analysis. Moreover – and this is interesting to mention while examining the genesis of \textit{Parerga and Paralipomena} – the plan of expounding modern philosophy by focusing on the ideal–real counterposition lead Schopenhauer to “things omitted”, too. He could retrieve his youth annotations and discussions on philosophers he had taken down while studying philosophy at university and preparing the first edition of his main work.

The chapter \textit{Ueber die Universitäts-Philosophie} is one of the most famous texts of \textit{Parerga and Paralipomena} and the analysis of its genesis through the manuscripts provides an interesting perspective. It provides an opportunity to better understand the relationship between its contents and those biographical elements that contributed to its composition.

First of all it is important to observe that in Schopenhauer’s works of the 1810s there is not any reference to Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel as “Philosophhassler”. Not even invectives against the “Professoren der Philosophie” are present. With regard to Hegel, it is worth mentioning that the very first reference to him is to be found only in a page written in 1821, but it is probably posterior to it. Schopenhauer was discussing the expression “Herz und Kopf” and remarked that those

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., f. 120.
two words “are to be found in all languages […] in the well-known metaphorical language” where “heart always signifies the will” and “head indicates the representation, knowledge”. If we look at the manuscript (Fig. 1) we can see that the reference to Hegel is a gloss on the margin and in parentheses – clearly inserted later – which reproaches him for not having included “Herz und Kopf” in his *Enzyklopädie*: “(Hegel censures them in the *Enzyklopädie*).”

Harsh criticism conjugated with sarcasm against the Philosophaster – that will characterize the chapter on the university professors – makes its appearance in the 1820s, during Schopenhauer’s hard times as neglected Privatdozent at the University of Berlin. It was an obscure period for the young teacher, when he began to understand that his philosophical system was disdained by the public and despised by professional philosophers. The unsuccessful destiny of *The World as Will and Representation* is quite famous: very few copies were sold and already in 1820 its publisher was aware that soon he should have to take the work out of circulation. Equally well known is the absence of students during Schopenhauer’s classes at Berlin, while in the meantime Hegel was enjoying enormous popularity. In 1828 he tried to be hired by the university of Würzburg, but the outcome was unfavourable. After leaving Berlin in 1830 he eventually dropped any ambition for a tenure position; but he nonetheless resented the success of other fellow philosophers and in 1841 he felt wounded by Schelling’s return on the chair of philosophy at Berlin.

Manuscripts are reliable witnesses of this connection between biography and the construction of the essay. Until 1821 Hegel is not even mentioned and the other two negative protagonists of the essay – Fichte and Schelling – are criticised and battled for reasons regarding their philosophies. Schopenhauer discusses their writings and opposes their approach to philosophy; he does not trust their arguments, he contest their notion of truth, and he ascribes excessive abstraction to their concepts – making philosophy lose its grip on reality. He is confident that their systems are not true and he is convinced that they do not respect Kant’s legacy; but he does not hesitate to consider them real philosophers and to appreciate their works as stimulating for his own research in metaphysics.

The first months in Berlin marked a turning point in his relationship with them. He started to use words like “charlatan” and “Windbeutel”. His assessments were less and less on their philosophies; he gradually stopped to discuss

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16 HN IV (1), 78–87. *Folsani*, f. 36: “(Hegel tadelt sie in der Enzyklopädie)” (HN (B) XII).
18 HN III, 66; *Reisebuch*, f. 175 (HN (B) XVII).
19 HN III, 85. *Folsani*, f. 50 (HN (B) XII).
them separately and started to refer to them as the "idealistic triad" or "Hegel und seine Rotte" even questioning that their intellectual production could be considered actual philosophy. It became less a conceptual struggle than a moral reprimand; and such moralism was later transformed in that kind of social criticism that ended by rebuffing the very notion of "philosophy professor". It appears that Schopenhauer's aim was not to struggle for his metaphysics anymore; rather he wanted to prove the inner falsity of the other philosophies of his time by their popular success and their social impact. Sociological criticism was the final outcome of Schopenhauer's intellectual elitism.

What mainly contributed to modifying the nature of Schopenhauer's disapproval was his unhappy university teaching experience at Berlin. He blamed Hegel for what he considered an unbearable humiliation and he involved Fichte and Schelling in his negative judgement of the postkantian university philosophy. It is worth mentioning that before meeting Hegel in person during his Proevenlesung at Berlin, on 23rd March 1820, Schopenhauer had manifested only a slight interest in Hegel and his works. Schopenhauer's metaphysics had risen from a daily deep confrontation with Kant and the development of Kantianism in Fichte's and Schelling's works - a confrontation that had started during his years as student at Göttingen and Berlin universities. Hegel had been completely absent from the process of germination of The World as Will and Representation. Sending back to Friedrich Ernst Frommann a copy of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, on 4th November 1813, Schopenhauer admitted that he had not read it and the book came once again in his hands only on 4th September 1818 - but only for five days.

Nonetheless it was Hegel who activated Schopenhauer's furore against the university professors of philosophy. Preparing a subject index of his manuscripts, Schopenhauer listed more than forty occurrences for the entry "Hegel und seine Rotte". In 1827 he introduced for the first time the word "Philosophaster" while denouncing their stupidity. Two years later, and for the first time, he identified the "Philosophaster" with the professors of philosophy and declared that the best thing for philosophy would be the abolition of the philosophy professorship. From this moment on, and until 1851, we can count more than fifty passages in the manuscripts criticising the professors and more than seventy concerning the "Philosophaster". Some of them were written in 1841 for

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20 HN III, 87. Foliant, f. 56 (HN (B) XII).  
21 GB, 6.  
22 He borrowed the work from the Dresden library: Schopenhauers Werke, Irs. von Paul Deussen, 16. Band, München 1942, 125.  
23 See Repertorium (HN (B) XV).  
24 "Dummheit der Philosophaster": HN III, 324. Foliant, f. 269 (HN (B) XII).  
25 HN III, 585. Adversaria, f. 250 (HN (B) VII).
a foreseen, but never published, foreword to the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*; others were inserted in the many sketches of the preface to the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, composed between 1841 and 1842; but, apart from a few lines, they were omitted from the 1844 published preface: they were left aside and thus could be used as material for the "things added" in the chapter *Über die Universitäts-Philosophie*.

Another complex and fascinating path is the one that leads from the manuscripts to the *Versuch über das Geistersehen* in the first volume of *Parerga and Paralipomena*. The essay gives a rational vindication of paranormal phenomena connecting metaphysical explanation (in accordance with the idea that the world is will), epistemological interpretation (in accordance with the notion of representation), and scientific accounts (in accordance with neurophysiological research in the first half of the 19th century). The manuscripts give wide and convincing evidence of the paths followed by Schopenhauer in assembling the material for the essay and of the difficulties that he encountered in a project that he had been pursuing for almost forty years. As a matter of fact, Schopenhauer’s first documented investigations into the subject of paranormal phenomena go back to the first half of the 1810s.

The very first source inducing him to seriously discuss that curious subject was a series of papers on the anatomy and physiology of the brain and the nervous system published between 1807 and 1812 by the celebrated physician, psychiatrist, and natural philosopher Johann Christian Reil – founder of the first disciplinary journal in the field of physiology and professor at Halle and Berlin. Those articles marked a significant breakthrough in the neuroanatomy and physiology of the autonomic nervous system and the cerebellum. Due to both his substantial interest in philosophy and his idea that medicine should be a science more than an art, Reil was able to excite Schopenhauer’s attention: his research on the functions of the nervous system became central in Schopenhauer's first inquiry into the enigmatic world of spiritualism.

It was 1815 when in his manuscripts Schopenhauer discussed at length a tentative explanation of the mysterious phenomena related to animal magnetism:

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26 HN IV (1), 266, 269, 285.
29 *Archiv für die Physiologie*. 12 Bände, Halle 1796–1815.
In the body the organ, the material representative, of knowing is the brain, and in just the same way the ganglionic system corresponds to the will. [...] The activity of the ganglionic system, which is the vegetative life, does not in the normal state enter consciousness at all, in other words it is not representation, is not objectivity of the will, but directly the will itself [...] Magnetizing or mesmerizing [...] decreases the power of the brain and increases exclusively that of the ganglionic system [...]. The consciousness, shifted into the solar plexus, is free from all the limitations of individuality. The somnambulist therefore knows just as well what goes on in other individuals and even at a great distance as what occurs in himself. The marvel of magnetism consists in its opening to knowledge the doors to the secret workshop of the will.31

It was a bold explanation that perfectly fitted the main notions of will and representation while they were fermenting into the metaphysical system. But Schopenhauer very soon became aware that paranormal activity was too complex a subject and scientific knowledge too immature and tentative to answer with any certainty the many riddles presented by extraordinary phenomena. He did not abandon reading and thinking about the subject, but he did not mention it in the first edition of the World as will and representation.

After 1819 we can list hundreds of passages in the manuscripts devoted to analyzing, discussing, and evaluating research on brain anatomy and activity, sleep and somnambulism, publications concerning magic and animal magnetism, and tales of exceptional phenomena like spirit seeing and clairvoyance.32 Schopenhauer later employed many of those materials when he prepared the chapter “Animalischer Magnetismus und Magie” in Über den Willen in der Natur (1836). Tracing them back to the manuscripts in the notebooks Adversaria (1828–30), Cogitata (1830–33), Cholerabuch (1831–32) and Pandectae (1832–37), we can observe that at the end of 1820s he decided to separate questions related to scientific explanations from the tales and testimonies on paranormal phenomena. He was still unconvinced by rational and scientific interpretations of those wonders but he was persuaded that they were too important from a philosophical point of view to be neglected. He then chose to insert them in the 1836 book as they offered impressive “confirmations” of the metaphysics of will; but he deliberately avoided confronting the major problem of how, as a physiological entity, the human body could manifest supernatural powers.

Eventually in the second half of the 1840s he became convinced that scientific research had given adequate evidence of the physiological ground of paranormal phenomena. Manuscripts after 1844 indicate renewed trust in the explica-

32 An index of those pages can be found in Repertorium (HN (B) XV) (see the facsimiles in www.SchopenhauerSource.org). See the entries: Magic, Hellsen, Somnambulismus, Schlaf, animalischer Magnetismus.
tive power of scientific research and he then decided to write the essay – providing both scientific and metaphysical explanations of paranormal phenomena – that was later published.\textsuperscript{33} We can easily see why it perfectly fitted the collection of “added” and “omitted” materials: contents and arguments put aside for forty years finally appeared coherent with the philosophical system. The projected complete explanation of paranormal phenomena according to science and philosophy that was the subject of a first assessment in 1815 could finally emerge in order “to add” something new to the system: making intelligible the most extraordinary phenomena as Will and Representation.

\textsuperscript{33} Spicilegia, f. 300, 331, 362, 399, 416, 433, 435, 442, 446, 448 (HN (B) X).